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DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS
Discovery proceedings in Wisconsin have been nick-named
"4096" examinations. Such number is the number of the section
wherein are found practically all of the statutory provisions for
such proceedings. It is intended here to state briefly how such
section has grown to its present proportions, what such section
now provides and what its advantages are.
THE GROWTH OF THE DISCOVERY STATUTE
IN WISCONSIN.
The section has had a remarkable growth. It was originally
Sections 54 and 55 of Chapter 137 of the Revised Statutes of
i858. As then constituted, it abolished actions for discovery
under oath in aid of actions; only the adverse party could be
examined; the examination could be had on five days' notice at
or before the trial; the examination could be had only in the
county of the party's residence or in the county where the party
was served, either in or outside of the state; if the party refused
to attend or testify, his pleading could be stricken out and he
could be punished for contempt; and either party could use the
deposition on the trial. Up to 1882, such in effect was the law
on the subject. Beginning in 1882 and continuing up to and
including the year 1917, the provisions have been constantly
changed. The changes have almost invariably resulted in addi-
tions to and broadening the scope of the law.
Chapter 194, Laws of 1882, authorized the examination of the
president, secretary, principal officer and other managing agent
of a corporation. Chapter 321, Laws of 1885, authorized the
court to limit the examination on one day's notice and provided
that if the examination was had before issue was joined in the
action there must be an affidavit in behalf of the party desiring
the examination as to the general nature and object of the action
and the points on which discovery was asked, and authorized a
further examination after issue was joined. Chapter 348, Laws
of 1889, authorized the officer taking the examination to compel
the party examined to answer and produce his books and papers,
by contempt proceedings. The statutes of 1898 authorized the
examination of such corporate officers as to matters within their
knowledge during the time of the occurrence of the facts on
which the action was based if they were then such officers, even
though they were not such officers when so examined. Chapter
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244, Laws of ioi, added the party's assignors, agents and em-
ployees as persons who could be so examined. Chapter 84, Laws
of 19o9, added that the officers, agents and employees could be
examined as to matters within their knowledge during the time
of the occurrence of the facts on which the action was based if
they were then so employed, even though not so employed when
so examined; that there might be a separate examination of each;
that if a non-resident party was to be examined, the court could
fix the time and place of the examination, and that after the
complaint was served defendant might examine on all points in
the complaint as though it were at issue as to all allegations.
Chapter 231, Laws of 1911, provided that if a party was a non-
resident, he could be examined in any county in the state where
he could be served; and that if a foreign corporation was a party
its officers, assignors, agents and employees could be examined
in any county in the state, the court fixing the time and place in
the state of the examination. Chapter 246, Laws of i913, pro-
vided tlhat the deposition could be used on the trial even though
the deponent was present on the trial. Chapter ioI, Laws of
1917, authorized either side to have such examinations after
the service of the complaint and a further examination after the
action was at issue.
Such in effect is the present Section 4096 of the 1917 Wis-
consin Statutes. It is a sample of the growth of remedial law in
a code state. As the section grew, its fairness and its advantage
to litigate became more and more apparent. It is surprising
how litigants were satisfied for so long a time to do without it
in its present form. Nevertheless it is probably safe to say that
this discovery statute has not reached its full growth. Experience
will show that it can be improved still more to accomplish what is
in effect intended, viz.: a complete discovery by a party pre-
liminary to trial of the facts, books and papers in the knowledge,
possession or control of the adverse party, his officers, agents
and employees as fully as though the examination constitutes the
trial pro tanto of the action. To the extent that such a deposi-
tion is now introduced in evidence at the trial, it constitutes a.
trial pro tanto.
It is hardly probable that any other state in the Union has a
discovery statute exactly like ours, unless the provisions of the
statutes of other states have been patterned after ours, as ours
has had a growth peculiar to itself. Our statute has grown to
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meet the demands of litigants to have a complete discovery before
trial where discovery is proper. We must then look principally
to the Wisconsin decisions for the construction of our discovery
statute.
WISCONSIN DECISIONS.
The examination is in the nature of a cross-examination.
Cleveland vs. Burnham, 6o Wis. 16.
Horlick M. M. Co. vs. Spiegel, 155 Wis. 201.
After issue joined, the court cannot limit the examination on
matters that are relevant to the issues.
Kelly vs. Ry., 6o Wis. 480.
Although the plaintiff has sufficient facts to frame a com-
plaint general in its terms, he is not barred from having the
examination before serving his complaint.
Schmidt vs. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529.
Sullivan vs. Ry., 152 Wis. 574.
The statute is liberally construed as it is a remedial statute.
Schmidt vs. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529.
An examination of the directors of a corporation who are not
necessary though proper parties to the action may be had.
Wells vs. Green Bay & M. C. Co., go Wis. 442.
The party offering the testimony may introduce such por-
tions as he wishes and the other party may then offer the other
portions that are explanatory.
Wunderlick vs. Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 382.
The production of physical articles may be compelled.
Horlick M. M. Co. vs. Spiegel, 155 Wis. 201.
The examination is both a special proceeding and a pro-
visional remedy; an order requiring a witness to produce cer-
tain papers is not appealable.
Phipps vs. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 130 Wis. 279.
Interlocutory orders regulating the manner of procedure in or
as to "4096" examinations are not appealable.
Id..
Neacy vs. Thomas, 148 Wis. 91.
An order practically denying the examination is appealable.
Kuryer Pub. Co. vs. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565.
An order requiring a witness to answer and submit to the
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examination and an order refusing to stay or restrain the exami-
nation are appealable.
Phipps vs. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 133 Wis. 153.
In this case the constitutionality of the' section as to certain
provisions affecting corporations was passed on and certain fea-
tures held unconstitutional.
If the affidavit served shows that no action exists or can
exist, no examination can be had.
State vs. Ry., 136 Wis. I79.
If the affidavit shows the party has sufficient facts to draw his
pleading, no examination before pleading can be had.
Ellinger vs. Equitable Life Soc., 138 Wis. 390.
A party need not know before pleading that he actually has
a cause of action in order to have the examination.
Am. F. P. Co. vs. Am. M. Co., 151 Wis. 385.
Sullivan vs. Ry., 152 Wis. 574.
A party is entitled to an examination to enable him to draw
the particular complaint required by the facts and to determine
who are and who are not liable and the nature of his case.
Sullivan vs. Ry., 152 Wis. 574.
The examination of persons residing in a foreign country
may be had under this statute on letters rogatory.
Hite vs. Keene, 137 Wis. 625.
The officer's charges for taking the examination are taxable
as disbursements.
Arpin vs. Bowman, 83 Wis. 54.
A defendant may examine a co-defendant where the latter is
in effect an adverse party to the former. "The true test is, are
their interests adverse?"
O'Day vs. Meyers, 147 Wis. 549.
Where an adverse party is called for cross-examination, his
counsel has no right to examine him at the close of such cross-
examination as this would permit such adverse party to prove
his case, or a part of it, as a part of the opponent's case.
O'Day vs. Meyers, 147 Wis. 549.
"Where plaintiff has called and examined an employee
of defendant as an adverse witness under Section 4068,
Statutes, defendant has a right to re-examine such witness
as to all matters tending to explain or qualify the testi-
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mony already given, though not as to new defensive mat-
ters, and may also ask the witness questions proper for the
purpose of impeachment, upon stating that he does not in-
tend thereafter to make the witness his own."
Adams vs. Bucyrus Co., 155 Wis. 70.
(This case passes on the ruling of a Circuit Court on the
examination of an adverse witness under Section 4o68, Wis.
Stats., on the trial of an action. In the writer's opinion, it has
no application to a "4o96" examination, as the latter contemplates
merely a cross-examination, as stated elsewhere in this article.)
The examinations are permitted in actions or special pro-
ceedings but not ordinarily in connection with motions.
Bresadola vs. Gogebic & Iron Co. R. & L. Co., 165 Wis.
109.
Formerly discovery of facts and papers resting in the knowl-
edge, possession or control of the adverse party could be had
only by a separate action of discovery, seeking no relief, but
merely in aid of some other action at law or in equity.
14 Cyc. 305.
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Some of the advantages are apparent from the reading of the
section. A party, long before his legal battle is staged in the
trial court, can go into his adversary's camp and inspect his
battle array and prepare for the fray accordingly. Months before
the final battle is fought he can learn how strong his adversary
is, and can enter into negotiations for peace or prepare for battle
intelligently.
Frequently such examinations result in voluntary, dismissals
of the suits or in settlements, and thereby expensive and annoy-
ing litigation is avoided. Again, the adversary is usually not so
well prepared at the "4096" examination to cover up things, to
object to the testimony, or to realize the importance of the testi-
mony taken, as he is on th trial of the action. He may not pre-
pare for the trial until shortly before the trial. If he is suddenly
served with a five days' notice of the "4o96" examination, his
time for preparation is limited, and frequently he appears on such
examination with no real conception of its importance in the case.
He probably gives his testimony more truthfully than if he had
more opportunity to prepare or reflect. Once examined, he is
practically bound to the story he has told on such examination.
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If he is examined all over again on the trial and is then con-
fronted with his "4o96" deposition, he is bound to be embarrassed
unless the two stories told agree in detail. If his testimony is
honestly given, the two stories will very likely agree substan-
tially, but otherwise they are very apt to disagree on important
points. If the case warrants the expense or the risk of the
expense, a "4096" examination will usually prove to be a good
investment.
WAIVING THE READING AND SIGNING OF
THE DEPOSITION.
The statute provides for counsel at their option waiving the
reading and signing of the deposition by the deponent and that
the deposition may in such case be used with the same force and
effect as though it were read and signed by the deponent. If the
reporter who takes the testimony is competent and reliable, it is
an advantage to both sides to agree to the waiver, as it saves
the time of the witness and the attorneys in the case, another
day's witness fees, and another day's attendance charge by the
officers taking the deposition. If there is no waiver, the witness,
upon reading' the deposition when transcribed, or upon reflection,
frequently wants to straighten out his testimony by correcting
what he claims are the reporter's mistakes (which they usually
are not), or what he claims is his new and correct conception of
what he should have testified. This at times leads to much
wrangling and many disagreeable disputes. Of course, proper
corrections must be made, and they should be made by the officer
taking the deposition at the foot of the deposition with proper
recitals. In most cases, the reading and signing of the deposi-
tion by the deponent are waived by counsel.
CORRECTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY TAKEN.
Frequently after the examination is concluded by the counsel
calling for the examination, the counsel for the adverse party
attempts to examine the witness to have him make corrections
or explanations of the testimony given. This is improper, in
the writer's opinion, for the reason that the witness .called under
such statute is there for cross-examination only. If any proper
corrections or explanations are to be made, they can be made at
the trial when the adverse party presents his defense. The delay
thus caused to the adverse party in having such corrections and
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explanations made can be excused accordingly. Nevertheless,
though he has no such right, it may often be well to permit the
adverse party to make the explanations and corrections at once
so that the testimony of the witness is complete, that is, as nearly
as it is possible for the witness to make it at the time, before he
has had time to fidfd further things to correct or explain. The
party so calling the witness under such section then knows the
whole story of the witness and can prepare for trial accordingly.
The injustice of permitting such explanations and corrections is
apparent at times when it results in a great deal of testimony
being taken on such points on the application of the adverse
party, thus possibly doubling the expense of the "4096" examina-
tion to the party calling the witness and putting it beyond his
power to limit the expense thereof. All too often the expense of
the "4096" is greater than was anticipated, without the counsel
for the adverse party increasing the number of the folios of the
testimony taken.
THE EXAMINATION IS SUBSTANTIALLY A
PARTIAL TRIAL OF THE CASE.
The cross-examination under such statute is the same as a
cross-examination on the trial. The officer taking the same, rules
on the admission and exclusion of the evidence submitted as fully
as though he were trying the case,, so that the deposition when
introduced at the trial will answer the same purpose as though
the testimony were given on the trial, and so that the attendance
of the witness at the trial is entirely unnecessary to get his story
into the case.
IN WHAT CASES THE EXAMINATION IS
PERMITTED.
It seems that in any action or proceeding in which any oral
testimony is to be introduced, a "4o96" examination is proper.
However, where the issues are only properly presentable on affi-
davits, the "4096" examination is not applicable.
IT IS NOT A FISHING EXPEDITION.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the "4o96"
examination is not to be considered merely a "fishing expedi-
tion." Nevertheless, a great many of such examinations are, in
effect, in great part "fishing expeditions," and to a large extent
properly so. The party calling for the examination should not
143
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
be permitted to have such an examination on the mere suspicion
that he may discover facts on which to base a case or a defense.
He should, before commencing such an examination, have some
good grounds to believe that the examination will result in dis-
closing details of evidence on which he can base a claim or a
defense in conjunction with the facts or information theretofore
in his possession. With such grounds and purpose, his fishing
for such details of evidence is, in the writer's opinion, perfectly
proper, and is contemplated by such statute.
MAX W. NOHL,
Member of Milwaukee Bar.
SUBSECTION 2 OF SECTION 2307 OF THE
WISCONSIN STATUTES
This section of the statute of frauds is as follows:
Agreements, what must be written. Section 2307. In the
following case every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement or some memorandum thereof, expressing the
consideration, be in writing and subscribed by the party
charged therewith:
(I) ... .............................................
(2) Every special- promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another person.
(3) ................................................
From its very language it will be seen that it involves only
a promise to pay the original debt of not the promisor, but the
debt of an obligor under a then existing obligation, or the pros-
pective debt of an original obligor of a contemplated obligation.
This distinction is well illustrated in the oft given example with
which the law student is first acquainted when studying this sec-
tion in contracts: If A enters a store with B and asks the pro-
prietor to sell goods to B, saying that "if B does not pay for
them, I will", or "B owes a debt to you and if he does not pay,
I will", that is such a special promise to answer for the debt of
another as to be within the letter of the statute and in order to
be valid must comply with the requirements expressed in the
statute. B is the principal debtor and the obligation to pay is his,
which obligation, however, also becomes A's if B fails to pay.
An illustration of this can be found in Reynolds vs. Carpenter,
3 Pinney, 34, where this statute was first construed in this state.
The defendant, a contractor, orally promised the plaintiff, a
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